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Several economists have maintained that social and internalized norms can enforce cooperation in
public good situations. This experimental study investigates impacts of social and internalized norms
for cooperation among strangers in a public good game. The experiment has two treatment effects.
First, it reveals each person's identity and his contribution to the public good. Second, it presents the
public good game in a language which suggests associations to social and internalized norms for
cooperation. Both treatment effects increase voluntary contributions significantly. These results
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31. Introduction
Several economists have maintained that social and internalized norms can enforce cooperation in
public good situations (Arrow 1971, Ullmann-Margalit 1977, North 1981, Andreoni 1990 and
Holländer 1990). A social norm is a rule of behavior that is enforced by social sanctions (Coleman
1990). These sanctions take the form of approval or disapproval. A social norm is internalized if it is
enforced by internal sanctions such as feelings of self-respect or guilt (Lindbeck 1997). An example of
a social norm is: “One should not litter”. In many cities a social norm against littering is strictly
enforced. In these cities littering is socially unaccepted, and a person throwing his ice-cream-paper on
the street will feel social disapproval from people observing him. Such disapproval is typically indirect
in nature. People will not necessarily berate a person who litters. Simply the fact that this person
knows that he is doing something that the people around him do not like makes him feel social
disapproval. Many people do not litter even if they know that nobody is observing them, because
littering imposes a feeling of guilt. These people have internalized a social norm against littering.
Social and internalized norms are typically conditional in nature: The social and internal approval a
person receives from adhering to a norm is felt more strongly as the number of people adhering to this
norm increases. The conditional nature of a norm gives rise to a coordination game. On the one hand,
if a person believes that other people will adhere to a social norm, then it is rational for him to adhere
to it as well. On the other hand, if a person believes that other people will not adhere to a social norm,
then it is not rational for him to adhere to it. Framing effects may play a significant role in determining
the equilibrium of this coordination game (Camerer and Fehr 2001). If the framing of the game makes
a person more optimistic about the other people's adherence to a norm, then the person will be more
likely to adhere to this norm.
This paper presents an experimental investigation of social and internalized norms for cooperation
among strangers in a public good game. The experiment has two treatment effects. First, it reveals
each person's identity and his contribution to the public good. This is done by making each subject
stand up and write his contribution to the public good on a blackboard in front of the other
participants. If the subjects have preferences for social approval, and expect the other participants to
socially disapprove of free riding, then this treatment effect should increase contributions. The second
treatment effect is introduction of associative framing. This is done by presenting the public good
game in a language which suggests associations to social and internalized norms for cooperation.
4Words like “cooperate” and “free-ride” are used frequently in this presentation. If norms for
cooperation are conditional, and the associative framing makes subjects more optimistic about the
other subject's adherence to a norm for cooperation, then this treatment effect should increase
contributions. The data shows that both by making each person's identity and contribution to the public
good common knowledge, and by giving subjects associations to social and internalized norms for
cooperation, voluntary contributions are increased significantly.
The experiment indicates that social and internalized norms for cooperation may play a prominent role
in the provision of a public good. Moreover, it suggests two policy recommendations: Firstly,
revealing each person's identity and his contribution to the public good may increase voluntary
contributions due to social norms for cooperation. This insight seems to be known to charities who
publicly list benefactors and their respective contributions. Blood banks also make use of this insight
by providing donors with stickers or T-shirts proclaiming “I give blood.” Secondly, presenting the
social dilemma in language that suggests associations to social and internalized norms for cooperation
may increase voluntary contributions due to the conditional nature of social and internalized norms.
Many hotels take advantage of this insight by asking their guests whether they will do their share to
improve the environment, and thereafter explaining that one way they can improve the environment is
to re-use their towels.
Several economists have maintained that social norms can have an impact on economic outcomes.
Involuntary unemployment has been explained on the basis of social norms that discourage unfair
wages (Akerlof 1980), and social norms that discourage underbidding of wages (Lindbeck and Snower
1988). Moreover, Lindbeck et al. (1999) analyze the economic consequences of social norms telling
people not to live on welfare. A number of authors have also argued that social norms might evolve
and enforce cooperation (Arrow 1971, Ullmann-Margalit 1977 and North 1981). Holländer (1990)
provides a formal analysis of such an argument by modeling social norms for cooperation in a public
good game.
A common approach in the economic analysis of social norms is to assume that people have
preferences for social approval (see Akerlof 1980, Lindbeck and Snower 1988, Lindbeck et al 1999,
Holländer 1990). Moreover, the choice of whether to approve or disapprove of a person is not
explicitly modeled. It is instead simply assumed that people who do not obey a social norm experience
social disapproval. The experiment presented in this paper finds empirical support for these
assumptions. It shows that simply the suspicion that someone dislikes one’s behavior may constitute a
5significant social cost for somebody disobeying a social norm. This finding is in line with Brennan and
Pettit (1993) and Loewenstein (2000) who argue that social sanctions can be indirect in nature and
thus, need not involve substantial costs on the sanctioners' part. The finding is, however, in contrast to
Coleman (1990) and Elster (1988 and 1989) who both stress that sanctioning of others generally
involves costs, and that it is only in an individual's self-interest to sanction if the benefits of
sanctioning exceed these costs.
In the economic analysis of social norms it is also common to assume that a social norm is conditional
(see Lindbeck and Snower 1988, Lindbeck et al. 1999). The experiment presented in this paper does
also find empirical support for this assumption. The fact that the associative framing increases
contributions significantly can be explained by a conditional norm. If a norm is conditional, and the
framing of the game makes a person more optimistic about other people's adherence to the norm, then
this person will be more likely to adhere to the norm.
Gächter and Fehr (1999) have conducted an experiment, which investigates the behavioral impact of
social norms. In Gächter and Fehr’s study, revealing each person's identity and his contribution to the
public good has a significant effect on behavior among people who have some knowledge of each
other1. However, in contrast to the experiment presented in this paper, such an introduction of social
sanctions does not have any significant effect on behavior among strangers. The experiment presented
in this paper suggests that the insignificant impact of social sanctions among strangers in Gächter and
Fehr (1999) may be due to unnecessary abstractions in the presentation of the public good game.
2. Experimental Design
The experiment is embedded in the following public good game. The 10 participants have 10×150
kroner (10 × $ 17) in a box. Each subject i has to decide how much money gi∈[0,150] to take from this
box. Subject i's monetary payoff is given by
πi=gi + ( )∑ −
j
jg15010
12 , j=1,..,..,n
This payoff formula ensures each participant an income of at least 30 kroner ($ 4) and at most 420
kroner ($ 49). The participants get no payments except from the payments they earn in the one period
1 See Fox and Guyer (1978) and Andreoni and Petri (2000) for similar results.
6public good game2. This payoff structure does not differ from the ones normally used in experimental
research on public goods (see Ledyard 1995).
One person at a time is asked to come up to the box. He then receives two envelopes, a "group envelope"
and a "personal envelope". In addition, he receives 150 kroner from the box. He has to bring the money
and the envelopes behind a screen where nobody, including the experimenters, can see him. Behind this
screen he has to divide the 150 kroner between the two envelopes, and seal them. To secure absolute
discretion, he then has to put both envelopes in a larger envelope, which he brings back to his seat.
When all of the participants have been through the above procedure, one person at a time steps
forward to the box to return the group envelope. The sum of the money in the group-envelopes is then
calculated. This sum is multiplied by two, and thereafter divided equally between all ten participants.
In addition to this money, each participant receives the money he puts in his personal envelope. He has
to keep this envelope sealed until he has left the lab.
The experiment has two treatment effects: Introduction of non-verbal social sanctions and introduction
of associative framing. This yields four different treatments (see Figure 1). In a no-sanctions-treatment
one person at a time has to return his sealed group envelope to the box. An experimenter mixes the ten
group envelopes. Then, he randomly draws one envelope at a time from the box, counts the amount of
money in the envelope, and writes the sum on the black board. This is done in front of all the partici-
pants. This procedure ensures full anonymity with regard to the contribution of each participant3, thus
making social sanctioning impossible.
Figure 1: The four different treatments
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2 On average each student earned 238 kroner ($ 27), which covers opportunity costs for the one-hour session.
3 Of course, this would not be strictly true if, for example, all subjects contributed nothing.
7In a sanctions-treatment one person at a time has to come up to the box with his sealed group
envelope. In front of all participants he has to open his envelope, count the amount of money in the
envelope, write the sum on the black board, and then put the money into the box. This procedure
ensures revelation of every participant's choice and identity, thus making non-verbal social sanctioning
possible.
In the associative-treatment the public good game is presented in language which suggests
associations to social and internalized norms for cooperation. The ten subjects are referred to as a
"community". The box is referred to as " the community box". The money in the box is said to belong
to the community. The group envelope is marked "the community", whereas the personal envelope is
marked "mine". Finally, the strategy choice is presented as follows: Each person can choose either to
be a free-rider by taking money from the community box, or to be a cooperator by not taking money
from the community box.
In the non-associative-treatment the instructions are written in a language which is not meant to give
associations to social norms for cooperation. The ten subjects are referred to as "participants in the
experiment". The box is simply referred to as "the box". The money in the box is said to belong to the
participants in the experiment. The group envelope is marked "back in the box", whereas the personal
envelope is marked "mine". Finally, the strategy choice is presented as follows: Each person can
choose either to take money from the box, or not to take money from the box.
For each treatment the instructions (see appendix) make all the relevant information given above
common knowledge for all participants. The instructions are read aloud. Then, the participants get
time to study the instructions individually. Finally, each participant has to answer questions that
investigate the subjects' understanding of the instructions. Those subjects revealing a lack of
understanding get special tutoring before the experiment starts. No oral communication is allowed at
any stage of the experiment.
Eight experimental sessions were conducted in February and March 2001. Ten students participated in
each of the session, and two sessions were conducted for each treatment. No student participated in
more than one session. Altogether 80 different students took part in the experiment, 20 in each
treatment. A session lasted approximately one hour. The students were recruited from the Blindern
campus of the University of Oslo4. The size of the pool and precautions taken in the recruiting process
4 About 25 000 students are registered at the Blindern campus of the University of Oslo.
8ensured that the participants in each session were strangers. This was confirmed in a questionnaire
filled in anonymously by the participants after the experiment.5 As no oral communication was
allowed, they remained unfamiliar with each other throughout the experiment. When a session was
over, the participants had to leave the experimental lab individually. These precautions were taken to
reduce the possibility that the subjects might sanction each other after the experiment.
3. Predictions
The traditional neoclassical model does not explicitly consider the impact of social and internalized
norms on behavior. Not considering social interaction, this model predicts that none of the subjects will
contribute to the public good, because they care only about their monetary payoff. In contrast to the
predictions of the neoclassical model, however, experiments show that subjects contribute from 30
percent to 70 percent in one-shot public good games, or in the early rounds of finitely repeated public
good games (see survey by Ledyard 1995). One explanation of these contributions may be that subjects
do not understand the game. It is well known that people learn not to be a sucker during the first periods
in a repeated public good experiment (Andreoni 1995, Ledyard 1995). A second explanation is that
people contribute due to internalized norms. Andreoni (1990) has provided a theoretical analysis of how
internalized norms increase voluntary contributions in public good games6. Innovative experiments
support Andreoni's theoretical analysis (Andreoni 1995, Palfrey and Prisbrey 1997). Moreover, an
experiment by Bohnet and Frey (1999) indicates that internalized social norms for giving are reinforced
if the members of each group are allowed to observe each other's faces prior to playing.
In the experiment presented in this article, misunderstanding of the game and internalized norms are
motives to contribute, which are present in all four treatments. The following two subsections will
discuss treatment dependent motives to contribute: Social sanctions and associative framing.
3.1 Social Sanctions
On the background of casual observations of real life social norms for cooperation among strangers, it
is expected that social norms can enforce cooperation in a public good experiment. If subjects have
preferences for social approval from strangers, and expect the other participants to socially disapprove
of free riding, then the introduction of indirect social sanctions should increase contributions. Thus,
5 80% of the participants reported not to have seen the face of any of the other participants in their session before. Only two
persons (2.5%) reported that they knew both the name and the face of some of the other participants in their session (one
contributed 100% (associative/sanctions-treatment) and one contributed 3% (non-associative/no-sanctions-treatment)).
6 Andreoni (1990) refers to a positive internal sanction as a "warm glow”.
9Hypothesis 1: Introduction of social sanctions among strangers increases contributions.
This hypothesis is in contrast to Gächter and Fehr (1999) who conclude from their experiment that
social sanctions do not have any significant behavioral effect among strangers. The insignificant
impact of social sanctions among strangers in Gächter and Fehr (1999) may be due to the abstract and
artificial situation constituted by a laboratory experiment. The abstract setting may induce subjects to
feel that social norms for cooperation in real life do not apply in the laboratory. The experiment
presented in this paper tries to avoid unnecessary abstractions. Actual money is used throughout the
experiment. The participants can see that there is money in the box. Then, each of the subjects receives
150 kroner from the box. Each subject has to divide these 150 kroner between two envelopes: one for
the group and one for himself. This puts the subjects in a more concrete situation as opposed to
traditional experiments, in which subjects are asked to specify their contribution to the public good on
a computer or a piece of paper. Such a concrete framing may induce subjects to find social norms for
cooperation in real life relevant in the experimental setting. On this background, Hypothesis 1 is
expected to hold despite the results of Gächter and Fehr (1999).
3.2 Associative Framing
Norms against littering, spitting on the sidewalk, free riding on public transportation, and cutting the
line are some examples of social and internalized norms enforcing cooperation in every day social
dilemmas. If norms for cooperation are conditional, then a framing of the public good game, which
enhances the subjects associations to real life norms for cooperation, should increase contributions.
This is because the associative framing makes subjects more optimistic about the other subject's
adherence to a social norm for cooperation. Thus,
Hypothesis 2: Giving subjects associations to norms for cooperation increases contributions.
There is a large amount of literature suggesting that behavior in a public good experiment is dependent
on the framing of the public good game. It has been shown experimentally, for example, that
contributions are significantly higher if the social dilemma is presented as the provision of a public
good instead of the prevention of a public bad (Andreoni 1995, Sonnemans et al. 1998, Willinger and
Ziegelmeyer 1999, and Park 2000). Moreover, Elliott et al. (1998) have shown that cooperative or
non-cooperative solutions may be elicited via institutional frames which implicate business standards
of teamwork or autonomy, respectively. In Cookson (2000) subjects contribute more when the payoff
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function is decomposed in terms of a gift, which is multiplied and distributed to the other players,
rather than the equivalent public good from which everyone benefits.
4. Results
The descriptive data indicates that the hypotheses are in general well borne out. In the following a
person’s contribution is denoted in percent of his maximum possible contribution. Figure 2 shows the
contribution mean and median for the four different treatments7. The contribution is lowest in the non-
associative/no-sanctions-treatment, in which subjects in average contribute 34.4 percent. Introducing
associations to norms for cooperation in the associative/non-sanctions-treatment increases the average
contribution to 55.1 percent, whereas introducing non-verbal social sanctioning in the non-
associative/sanctions-treatment increases the average contribution to 68.2 percent. Finally, introducing
both non-verbal social sanctioning and associations to norms for cooperation in the
associative/sanctions-treatment increases the average contribution to 77.3 percent.
Figure 2: Mean and median contribution levels
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The data clearly support Hypothesis 1: Introduction of social sanctions among strangers increases
contributions. The hypothesis that contributions in the non-associative/sanctions-treatment are not
higher than contributions in the non-associative/no-sanctions-treatment is rejected at a 0.05 level of
significance (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney one-sided exact test8, p=0.011). The hypothesis that
7 See Figure 4 in the appendix for the cumulative distribution.
8 The independence condition of the test is met because no student participates more than one time.
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contributions in the associative/sanctions-treatment are not higher than contributions in the
associative/no-sanctions-treatment, is also rejected at a 0.05 level of significance (same test, p=0.044).
Moreover, the hypothesis that contributions in the non-associative/sanctions-treatment and the
associative/sanctions-treatment are not higher than contributions in the non-associative/no-sanctions-
treatment and the associative/no-sanctions-treatment, can be rejected at a 0.005 level of significance
(p=0.0021). These results provide empirical support for the underlying assumption of economic
analysis of social norms (Akerlof 1980, Lindbeck and Snower 1988, Lindbeck et al 1999, Holländer
1990). People do indeed have preferences for social approval. Moreover, the results suggest an
important policy tool: Revealing each person's identity and his contribution to the public good may
increase voluntary contributions due to social norms for cooperation.
The data do also support Hypothesis 2: Giving subjects associations to norms for cooperation will
reinforce the impact of social and internalized sanctions. The hypotheses that contributions in the
associative/no-sanctions-treatment are not higher than contributions in the non-associative/no-
sanctions-treatment is rejected at a 0.1 level of significance (p=0.090). Moreover, the hypothesis that
contributions in the associative/sanctions-treatment and the associative/non-sanctions-treatment are
not higher than contributions in the non-associative/sanctions-treatment and the non-associative/no-
sanctions-treatment, can be rejected at a 0.1 level of significance (p=0.079). These results suggest an
important policy tool: Voluntary contributions to a public good may increase if the social dilemma is
presented in language that suggests associations to social and internalized norms for cooperation.
Moreover, these results indicate that norms are indeed conditional, which is an underlying assumption
in economic analysis of social norms (Lindbeck and Snower 1988, Lindbeck et al 1999).
The hypotheses that contributions in the associative/sanctions-treatment are not higher than
contributions in the non-associative/sanctions-treatment can not be rejected (p=0.25). This
insignificant effect of associative framing in a sanctions-treatment can be explained by a "ceiling
effect". There is not much room for a significant increase in voluntary contributions due to associative
framing, because the contribution level is already very high due to social sanctions.
Figure 3 shows the number of subjects contributing: 1) nothing, 2) an amount strictly between zero
and hundred percent, and 3) one hundred percent. In the following these subjects will be referred to as
non-contributors, intermediate contributors, and full contributors, respectively. Note from the figure
that the number of non-contributors is similar across all four treatments. Moreover, there is a non-
negligible fraction of full contributors in all treatments. Finally, introducing social sanctions or
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associative framing decreases the number of intermediate contributors, while increasing the number of
full contributors. These observations suggest that there are three types of people9: First, there are some
people who do not contribute anything irrespective of the presence of social sanctions or associative
framing. These people do not seem to care about social approval, or have any internalized norms for
cooperation. This observation is in line with an experiment by Andreoni and Miller (2001) in which
approximately one quarter of the subjects do not respond to non-monetary incentives. Second, there
are some people who are full contributors even when there is no introduction of social sanctions or
associative framing. These people seem to have strongly internalized norms for cooperation, or they
may have misunderstood the game. Third, more than 80 percent seem to be responsive to the
introduction of social sanctions or associative framing. Such people seem to care about social
approval. Moreover, they seem to have internalized social norms for cooperation.
Figure 3: Number of subjects in different contribution intervals
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9 A similar classification of people is suggested in Ledyard 1995, pp. 172-173.
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5. Conclusion
Several economists have maintained that social and internalized norms can enforce cooperation in
public good situations (Arrow 1971, Ullmann-Margalit 1977, North 1981, Andreoni 1990 and
Holländer 1990). The experiment presented in this paper detects two possible policy tools to crowd in
such norms. One policy tool is to reveal each person's identity and his contribution to the public good.
Indeed, the experiment suggests that it is possible to increase contributions to a public good by
establishing an arrangement where the stakeholders can observe each other's contributions to the
public good. It is worth noting the inexpensive nature of this policy compared to surveillance systems
such as the police. An example of this is public transportation. Instead of intensifying the ticket
controls at subway stations, it may be just as efficient simply to let a free rider be observable to as
many of the other passengers as possible. An arrangement observed in some cities is a physical
obstacle at the entrance to the underground. For safety reasons the obstacle is easily passed without a
ticket, but a non-ticket-carrier jumping over the hindrance cannot avoid being observed by other
passengers.
A second policy tool is to give subjects associations to social and internalized norms for cooperation.
The experiment suggests that if people are reminded of norms for cooperation when they are about to
make a decision of whether to cooperate or free-ride, then they are more likely to cooperate. This may,
for example, suggest that posters at subway stations, reminding the passengers of the public nature of
the supply of public transportation and of norms for cooperation, can reduce free riding.
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Appendix
The cumulative distribution function
Figure 4: The cumulative distribution function (number of subjects contributing the given
amount or less)
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Instructions (Translated from Norwegian)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-associative framing treatments:
The experiment is to proceed in silence. Talking is prohibited.
You and the 9 other experimental participants in the room have 1500 kroner in this box.
You can either take money out of the box or you can leave the money in the box. If you decide to take money
from the box, you may decide for yourself how much money to take, but the amount may not exceed 150 kroner.
After all participants have had the opportunity to take or not to take money out of the box, the amount of money
remaining in the box will be counted. This amount will be doubled and will then be divided between all ten
participants.
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This means that your total earnings from this experiment are dependent upon the choices that you and the other
participants make under the following rule:
Your total earnings: = The money you take from the box
+ One tenth of twice the sum of money remaining in the box
Note that regardless of what the other participants choose to do, you will receive the most money if you take all
150 kroner out of the box. However, as a group, all of the participants will receive the most money if no one
takes any money out of the box.
[Non-sanction treatment: No one will know whether you take money out of the box or not.]
[Sanction treatment: All of the other participants will know if you take money out of the box or not.]
One person at a time will be asked to come forward. After coming forward you will receive two envelopes, one
marked "back in the box" and one marked "mine". You will also receive 150 kroner from the box (2 fifty kroner
notes, 1 20 kroner coin, 2 ten kroner coins, 1 five kroner coin and 5 one kroner coins). You will bring both the
money and the envelopes with you behind a screen. While no one can see, you will divide the money between
the two envelopes as you see fit: If you don’t want to take any money out of the box, put all 150 kroner in the
envelope marked “back in the box” and put nothing into the envelope marked “mine.” If you want to take all
150 kroner out of the box, put all 150 kroner into the envelope marked “mine” and put nothing into the envelope
marked “back in the box.” If you want to take some money then put some money into the envelope marked
“mine” and put the rest into the envelope marked “back in the box.”
After you have done this, seal both envelopes and put them both into a big, brown envelope which you will then
take with you back to your seat. You may take the envelope marked “mine” home with you when the experiment
is finished but you will put the contents of the envelope marked “back in the box” back into the box at a later
point in the experiment.
Once everyone has divided the money between the two envelopes, one person at a time will be asked to come
forward with the envelope marked "back in the box".
[Non-sanction treatment: When you come forward you will put the closed envelope into the box. You will then
return to your seat. Once everyone has placed their envelopes marked “back in the box” into the box, the
envelopes will be mixed. We will then open the envelopes one at a time, count the money, write the amount on
the blackboard, and put the money back into the box.
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Thus no one will know whether or not you have taken money from the box. Likewise, you won’t know what any
of the other participants have chosen to do.]
[Sanction treatment: When you come forward you will open the envelope and count the money in front of the
other participants. You will then write the amount on the blackboard. You will then put the money into the box
and return to your seat.
Thus the other participants will know whether or not you have taken any money from the box. Likewise, you
will know what each of the other participants has chosen to do.]
The amount of money now present in the box is doubled, and this new sum is divided equally between all ten
experimental participants.
At the end of the experiment each person will leave the lab separately.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Examples:
• If no one takes anything from the box, 1500 kroner will remain in it. Double this sum (=3000) is then divided equally between all
participants such that each participant will receive 300 kroner.
• If everyone takes 150 kroner from the box, no money will remain in it, thus leaving no money to be divided equally. Each participant
will then only receive the 150 kroner that he took.
• If none of the other participants take anything, but you take 150 kroner, then (1500-150=) 1350 kroner will remain in the box. Double
this sum (=2700) is then divided equally between all participants (=270 for each). You will then receive the 150 kroner you have
taken and the additional share from the box; making a total of (150 + 270=) 420 kroner. Each of the other participants will then
receive 270 kroner.
• If all of the other participants take 150 kroner, but you take nothing, then 150 kroner will remain in the box (the money you did not
take). Double this sum (=300) is then divided equally between all participants. You will then receive only the share from the box, i.e.
30 kroner. Each of the others will receive (150 + 30=) 180 kroner.
• Suppose half of the experimental participants (5 persons) take 150 kroner, 4 take nothing and you:
1. take nothing.
• The box then contains 750 kroner (1500 - 5x150).
• Double this sum (=1500) is then divided equally (150 for each).
• You receive 150 kroner.
• The 4 who did not take anything receive 150 kroner each (the same as you).
• The 5 who took 150 kroner receive 300 kroner each (150 + 150).
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• In total all experimental participants receive 2250 kroner (150 + 4x150 + 5x300).
2. take as much as possible (150 kroner).
• The box then contains 600 kroner (1500 - 6x150).
• Double this sum (=1200) is then divided equally (120 for each).
• You receive 270 kroner (150 +120).
• The 4 who did not take anything receive 120 kroner each.
• The 5 who took 150 kroner from the box receive 270 kroner (the same as you).
• In total all experimental participants receive 2100 kroner (270 + 4x120 + 5x270).
Note the following:
• In total, the group receives more money the more the people choose not to take money from the box. In the example above we see
that the total payment to all of the participants declines from 2250 to 2100 when you take 150 kroner from the box as compared to
when you take nothing.
• Regardless of what the others choose to do, the more you take from the box the greater your payment. In the example above we see
that your payment increases from 150 to 270 when you take 150 kroner as compared to when you take nothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Associative framing treatments:
The experiment is to proceed in silence. Talking is prohibited.
You and the 9 other experimental participants in this room constitute a community. The community has 1500
kroner in a community box.
You can either free ride on the community by taking money from the community box, or cooperate with the
community by not taking anything from the community box. If you want to free ride on the community, you may
decide how much money to take from the community box, but the amount may not exceed 150 kroner. After
everyone in the community has the opportunity to free ride on the community or to cooperate with the
community, the amount of money remaining in the community box will be counted. This amount will be doubled
and will then be divided equally between all ten community members.
This means that your total earnings from this experiment are dependent upon the choices that you and the other
participants make under the following rule:
Your total earnings: = The money you take from the community box
+ One tenth of twice the sum of money remaining in the community box.
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Note that regardless of what the other community members choose to do, you will receive the most money if you
free ride on the community by taking all 150 kroner out of the community box. However, as a group, the
community will receive the most money if everyone cooperates by not taking any money out of the community
box.
[Non-sanction treatment: No one will know whether you free ride on the community or not.]
[Sanction treatment: All of the members of the community will know if you free ride on them or not.]
One person at a time will be asked to come forward. After coming forward you will receive two envelopes, one
marked "community" and one marked "mine". You will also receive 150 kroner from the box (2 fifty kroner
notes, 1 20 kroner coin, 2 ten kroner coins, 1 five kroner coin and 5 one kroner coins). You will bring both the
money and the envelopes with you behind a screen. While no one can see, you will divide the money between
the two envelopes as you see fit: If you want to cooperate, put all 150 kroner in the envelope marked “commu-
nity” and put nothing into the envelope marked “mine.” If you want to free ride as much as possible, put all 150
kroner into the envelope marked “mine” and put nothing into the envelope marked “community.” If you want to
free ride a bit, put some money into the envelope marked “mine” and put the rest into the envelope marked
“community.”
After you have done this, seal both envelopes and put them both into a big, brown envelope which you will then
take with you back to your seat. You may take the envelope marked “mine” home with you when the
experiment is finished but you will put the contents of the envelope marked “community ” back into the box at a
later point in the experiment.
Once everyone has divided the money between the two envelopes, one person at a time will be asked to come
forward with the envelope marked "community".
[Non-sanction treatment: When you come forward you will put the closed envelope into the box. You will then
return to your seat. Once everyone has placed the their envelopes marked “community ” into the box, the
envelopes will be mixed. We will then open the envelopes one at a time, count the money, write the amount on
the blackboard, and put the money back into the community box.
Thus no one will know whether or not you chose to free ride on the community. Likewise, you won’t know what
any of the other community members have chosen to do.]
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[Sanction treatment: When you come forward you will open the envelope and count the money in front of the
other community members. You will write the amount on the blackboard. You will then put the money into the
community box and return to your seat.
Thus the other community members will know whether or not you have taken any money from the box.
Likewise, you will know what each of the other community members has chosen to do.]
The amount of money now present in the community box is doubled, and this new sum is divided equally
between all ten community members.
At the end of the experiment each person will leave the lab separately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Examples:
• If everyone in the community cooperates, 1500 kroner will remain in the community box. Double this sum (=3000) is then divided
equally between everyone in the community such that each community member will receive 300 kroner.
• If everyone in the community free rides as much as possible by taking 150 kroner from the community box, no money will remain in
the community box, thus leaving no money to be divided equally. Each community member will then only receive the 150 kroner he
took.
• If all other community members cooperate, but you take 150 kroner, then (1500-150=) 1350 kroner will remain in the community
box. Double this sum (=2700) is then divided equally between everyone in the community (=270 for each). You will then receive the
150 kroner you have taken and the additional share from the community box; a total (150 + 270=) 420 kroner. Each of the other
community members will then receive 270 kroner.
• If all other community members free ride as much as possible (takes 150 kroner), but you cooperate, then 150 kroner will remain in
the community box (the money you did not take). Double this sum (=300) is then divided equally between everyone in the
community. You will then receive only the share from the community box, i.e. 30 kroner. Each of the others receives (150 + 30=) 180
kroner.
• Suppose half of the community members (5 persons) free ride as much as possible, 4 cooperate and you:
1. cooperate.
• The community box then contains 750 kroner (1500 - 5x150).
• Double this sum (=1500) is then divided equally (150 for each).
• You receive 150 kroner.
• The 4 who cooperated receive 150 kroner each (the same as you).
• The 5 who free rode as much as possible receive 300 kroner each (150 + 150).
• In total the community receives 2250 kroner (150 + 4x150 + 5x300).
2. free ride as much as possible (150 kroner).
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• The community box then contains 600 kroner (1500 - 6x150).
• Double this sum (=1200) is then divided equally (120 for each).
• You receive 270 kroner (150 +120).
• The 4 who cooperated receive 120 kroner each.
• The 5 who free rode as much as possible receive 270 kroner (the same as you).
• In total the community receives 2100 kroner (270 + 4x120 + 5x270).
Note the following:
• In total, the community receives more money the more people choose to cooperate. In the example above we see that the total
payment to the community declines from 2250 to 2100 when you free ride as compared to when you cooperate.
• Regardless of what the other community members choose to do, the more you free ride on the community, the greater your payment
will be. In the example above we see that your payment increases from 150 to 270 when you free ride as compared to when you
cooperate.
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